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Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V [electronic resource] : Designing Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2003 Workshop, AMEC 2003, Melbourne, Australia, July 15. 2003, Revised Selected Papers / edited by Peyman Faratin, David C. Parkes, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar, William E. Walsh.

Contributor(s): Material type: TextSeries: Publisher: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2004Edition: 1st ed. 2004Description: VII, 153 p. online resourceContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9783540259473
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 006.3 23
Online resources:
Contents:
Section I: Automated Negotiation -- Automated Negotiation and Bundling of Information Goods -- Two Stock-Trading Agents: Market Making and Technical Analysis -- Acquiring Tradeoff Preferences for Automated Negotiations: A Case Study -- A Decommitment Strategy in a Competitive Multi-agent Transportation Setting -- Section II: Mechanism Design -- Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation -- Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctions -- Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibrium -- Section III: Multi-agent Markets -- Improving Learning Performance by Applying Economic Knowledge -- Handling Resource Use Oscillation in Multi-agent Markets.
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Section I: Automated Negotiation -- Automated Negotiation and Bundling of Information Goods -- Two Stock-Trading Agents: Market Making and Technical Analysis -- Acquiring Tradeoff Preferences for Automated Negotiations: A Case Study -- A Decommitment Strategy in a Competitive Multi-agent Transportation Setting -- Section II: Mechanism Design -- Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation -- Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctions -- Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibrium -- Section III: Multi-agent Markets -- Improving Learning Performance by Applying Economic Knowledge -- Handling Resource Use Oscillation in Multi-agent Markets.

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