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Governing the Commons : The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.

Av: Materialtyp: TextSerie: Utgivningsuppgift: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2015Datum för upphovsrätt: ©2015Utgåva: 1st edBeskrivning: 1 online resource (298 pages)Innehållstyp:
  • text
Medietyp:
  • computer
Bärartyp:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9781316456804
Genre/form: DDK-klassifikation:
  • 333.2
Onlineresurser:
Innehåll:
Intro -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1 Reflections on the Commons -- Three influential models -- The tragedy of the commons -- The prisoner's dilemma game -- The logic of collective action -- The metaphorical use of models -- Current policy prescripitons -- Leviathan as the "only" way -- Privatization as the "only" way -- The "only" way? -- An alternative solution -- An empirical alternative -- Policy prescriptions as metaphors -- Policies based on metaphors can be harmful -- A Challenge -- Chapter 2 An Institutional Approach to the Study of Self-Organization and Aelf-Governance in CPR Situations -- The CPR situation -- CPRs and resource units -- Rational appropriators in complex and uncertain situations -- Interdependence, independent action, and collective action -- The theory of the firm -- The theory of the state -- Three puzzles: supply, commitment, and monitoring -- The problem of supply -- The problem of credible commitment -- The problem of mutual monitoring -- Framing inquiry -- Appropriation and provision problems -- Multiple levels of analysis -- Studying institutions in field setings -- Chapter 3 Analyzing Long-Enduring, Self-Organized, and Self-Governed CPRs -- Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests -- Tarbel, Switzerland -- Hirano, Nagaike, and Yamanoka villages in Japan -- Huerta irrigation institutions -- Valencia -- Murcia and Orihuela -- Alicante -- Zanjera irrigation communites in the philippines -- Similarities among enduring, self-governing CPR institutions -- Clearly defined boundaries -- Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions -- Collective-choice arrangements -- Monitoring -- Graduated sanctions -- Conflict-resolution mechanisms -- Minimal recognition of rights to organize -- Nested enterprises.
Chapter 4 Analyzing Institutional Change -- The competitive pumping race -- The setting -- The logic of the water-rights game -- The litigation game -- The Raymond Basin negotiations -- The West Basin negotiations -- The Central Basin litigation -- Conformance of parties to negotiated settlements -- The entrepreneurship game -- Reasons for forming a district to include both basins -- Reasons against forming a district to include both basins -- The polycentric public-enterprise game -- The analysis of institutional supply -- Incremental, sequential, and self-transforming institutional change in a facilitative political regime -- Reformulating the analysis of institutional change -- Chapter 5 Analyzing Institutional Failures and Fragilities -- Two Turkish inshore fisheries with continuing CPR problems -- California groundwater basins with continuing CPR problems -- A Sri Lankan fishery -- Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka -- The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries -- Lessons to be learned from comparing the cases in this study -- Chapter 6 A Framework for Analysis of Self-Organizing and Self-Governing CPRs -- The problems of supply, credible commitment, and mutual monitoring -- A framework for analyzing institutional choice -- Evaluating benefits -- Evaluating costs -- Evaluating shared norms and other opportunities -- The process of institutional change -- Predicting institutional change -- A challenge to scholarship in the social sciences -- Notes -- References -- Index.
Sammanfattning: The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Elinor Ostrom provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved.
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Intro -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter 1 Reflections on the Commons -- Three influential models -- The tragedy of the commons -- The prisoner's dilemma game -- The logic of collective action -- The metaphorical use of models -- Current policy prescripitons -- Leviathan as the "only" way -- Privatization as the "only" way -- The "only" way? -- An alternative solution -- An empirical alternative -- Policy prescriptions as metaphors -- Policies based on metaphors can be harmful -- A Challenge -- Chapter 2 An Institutional Approach to the Study of Self-Organization and Aelf-Governance in CPR Situations -- The CPR situation -- CPRs and resource units -- Rational appropriators in complex and uncertain situations -- Interdependence, independent action, and collective action -- The theory of the firm -- The theory of the state -- Three puzzles: supply, commitment, and monitoring -- The problem of supply -- The problem of credible commitment -- The problem of mutual monitoring -- Framing inquiry -- Appropriation and provision problems -- Multiple levels of analysis -- Studying institutions in field setings -- Chapter 3 Analyzing Long-Enduring, Self-Organized, and Self-Governed CPRs -- Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests -- Tarbel, Switzerland -- Hirano, Nagaike, and Yamanoka villages in Japan -- Huerta irrigation institutions -- Valencia -- Murcia and Orihuela -- Alicante -- Zanjera irrigation communites in the philippines -- Similarities among enduring, self-governing CPR institutions -- Clearly defined boundaries -- Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions -- Collective-choice arrangements -- Monitoring -- Graduated sanctions -- Conflict-resolution mechanisms -- Minimal recognition of rights to organize -- Nested enterprises.

Chapter 4 Analyzing Institutional Change -- The competitive pumping race -- The setting -- The logic of the water-rights game -- The litigation game -- The Raymond Basin negotiations -- The West Basin negotiations -- The Central Basin litigation -- Conformance of parties to negotiated settlements -- The entrepreneurship game -- Reasons for forming a district to include both basins -- Reasons against forming a district to include both basins -- The polycentric public-enterprise game -- The analysis of institutional supply -- Incremental, sequential, and self-transforming institutional change in a facilitative political regime -- Reformulating the analysis of institutional change -- Chapter 5 Analyzing Institutional Failures and Fragilities -- Two Turkish inshore fisheries with continuing CPR problems -- California groundwater basins with continuing CPR problems -- A Sri Lankan fishery -- Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka -- The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries -- Lessons to be learned from comparing the cases in this study -- Chapter 6 A Framework for Analysis of Self-Organizing and Self-Governing CPRs -- The problems of supply, credible commitment, and mutual monitoring -- A framework for analyzing institutional choice -- Evaluating benefits -- Evaluating costs -- Evaluating shared norms and other opportunities -- The process of institutional change -- Predicting institutional change -- A challenge to scholarship in the social sciences -- Notes -- References -- Index.

The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Elinor Ostrom provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved.

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