Aktionärsstruktur und Wettbewerb Eine theoretische und empirische Untersuchung zur kartellrechtlichen Bedeutung von Common Ownership am Beispiel BlackRock
Materialtyp:
ArtikelSerie: Utgivningsinformation: Baden-Baden Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG 2025Beskrivning: 1 electronic resource (335 p.)Innehållstyp: - text
- computer
- online resource
- 9783748952947
- 9783756024193
Open Access Unrestricted online access star
Do large asset managers like BlackRock threaten competition? The author shows that a competitive theory of harm lacks plausibility when the legal and factual framework conditions are taken into account. In the theoretical review; neither sufficient possibilities of exerting influence nor a uniform industry-wide interest of asset managers can be substantiated. The empirical-quantitative evaluation using the example of BlackRock's ETF portfolios confirms the theoretical preliminary considerations regarding the lack of a uniform industry-wide interest due to conflicts of interest between funds. Stricter antitrust law or regulation to limit common ownership is therefore not advisable.
Funded by: Max Planck Society (MPG)
Funded by: Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
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