Chapter 7 The Power to Perform Experiments
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ArtikelUtgivningsinformation: Taylor & Francis Routledge [Imprint] 2022Beskrivning: 1 electronic resource (29 p.)Innehållstyp: - text
- computer
- online resource
- 9780367637149
- 9780367646981
- Philosophy and Religion
- Philosophy
- Topics in philosophy
- Philosophy: metaphysics and ontology
- Religion and beliefs
- Religion: general
- Philosophy of religion
- Alexander Pruss
- Anne Peterson
- Antonio Ramos-Diaz
- Aristotelianism
- Christopher Hauser
- Daniel De Haan
- David Oderberg
- Edward Feser
- Hasok Chang
- James Orr
- Janice Chik
- Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics
- Nicholas Teh
- Q Philosophy and Religion
- QD Philosophy
- QDT Topics in philosophy
- QDTJ Philosophy
- QR Religion and beliefs
- QRA Religion
- QRAB Philosophy of religion
- Robert Koons
- Ross Inman
- Stephen Boulter
- Travis Dumsday
- William M.R. Simpson
- animal powers
- causal powers
- essentialism
- evolution
- experiments
- general
- grounding
- hylomorphism
- materialism
- mathematical powers
- metaphysics and ontology
- naturalism
- philosophy of nature
- pluralism
- proportionality
- science and theology
- substantial powers
- thema EDItEUR
- theology of nature
- thermochemical powers
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Do humans have abilities to perform scientific experiments? Do humans possess real powers for performing scientific experiments? I shall treat these two questions in turn where the first will bring us to the second. I shall argue that the scientific image of humans must cohere with the manifest image of humans as having the ability to exercise rational embodied control, which constitutes the power to perform scientific experiments. I first argue why rational embodied control is indispensable to the ability to perform a scientific experiment. I then argue that an ontology of causal powers provides the best explanation for this ability to make the causal difference in reality required for scientists to effectively perform scientific experiments and arrive at scientific truths. I then conclude by considering a major objection against the alternative standard causal theory of action, which would also undermine the thesis that scientists perform experiments. I show why neo-Aristotelian causal power realism does not face this objection in its explanation of how scientists exercise real rational embodied causal control within their experiments.
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