Evading the Patronage Trap Interest Representation in Mexico
Materialtyp:
ArtikelUtgivningsinformation: University of Michigan Press 2022Beskrivning: 1 electronic resource (328 p.)Innehållstyp: - text
- computer
- online resource
- 9780472055449
- 9780472075447
- Society and Social Sciences
- Politics and government
- Central government
- Central government policies
- ANEC
- Alianza para el Campo
- Asociación Nacional de Empresas Comercializadores
- CANACINTRA
- CCC
- CNC
- CONCANACO
- COPARMEX
- Central Campesina Cardenista
- Confederación Nacional Campesina
- Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana
- Confederación de Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio
- Cámara Nacional de la Industria de la Transformación
- Estado de México
- Fondo PyME
- Jalisco
- Mexico
- Michoacán
- PAN
- PRD
- PRI
- Patronage trap
- Servicios y Turismo
- agriculture
- business chambers
- civil society
- clientelism
- demand making
- development policy
- distributive politics
- interest organizations
- interest representation
- linkages
- political parties
- subsidies
Open Access Unrestricted online access star
Why have Latin American democracies proven unable to confront the structural inequalities that cripple their economies and stymie social mobility? Brian Palmer-Rubin contends that we may lay the blame on these countries' systems of interest representation, which exhibit "biased pluralism," a system in which the demands of organizations representing economic elites—especially large corporations—predominate. A more inclusive model of representation would not only require a more encompassing and empowered set of institutions to represent workers, but would also feature spaces for non-eliteproducers—such as farmers and small-business owners to have a say in sectoral economic policies. With analysis drawing on over 100 interviews, an original survey, and official government data, this book focuses on such organizations and develops an account of biased pluralism in developing countries typified by the centrality of patronage—discretionarily allocated state benefits. Rather than serving as conduits for demand-making about development models, political parties and interest organizations often broker state subsidies or social programs, augmenting the short-term income of beneficiaries, but doing little to improve their long-term economic prospects. When organizations become diverted into patronage politics, the economic demands of the masses go unheard in the policies that most affect their lives, and along the way, their economic interests go unrepresented.
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eng
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