Deference to the Executive? The Development of Judicial Review in Foreign Affairs in the United States of America, Germany and South Africa
Material type:
ArticleSeries: Publication details: Baden-Baden Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG 2024Description: 1 electronic resource (434 p.)Content type: - text
- computer
- online resource
- 9783748943853
- 9783756010790
- Law
- Laws of specific jurisdictions and specific areas of law
- Constitutional and administrative law: general
- Law: Human rights and civil liberties
- History of constitution and comparative constitutional law
- Certifications
- Chevron
- Doctrines of discretion
- Foreign Affairs
- Germany
- Reduced levels of scrutiny
- Saarstatut
- Sanchez Llamas and Hamdan
- South Africa
- Standing
- Supreme Court
- USA
- Washington Agreement
- deference
- non-reviewability
- reduced level of review
- separation of powers in foreign affairs
- suggestions
Open Access Unrestricted online access star
The book examines the changing approach of courts in reviewing foreign affairs decisions of the executive. Traditionally, the judiciary awarded deference to executive decisions in that area, a notion that clashes with the idea of general judicial oversight in the modern constitutional state. As the problem is often looked at solely from a national angle, this thesis chooses a comparative approach taking into account the development in three democratic countries to identify general trends as well as differences. Thereby, it shows the development of a new judicial approach, which does not per se defer to executive assessments in the field.
Funded by: Max-Planck-Gesellschaft
Creative Commons Licence cc by cc https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eng
Freely available e-book